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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the 2016 US Presidential Election on the volatility of the 
US capital markets. In addition to the election date, we analyze seven other events that are potentially 
influential to the direction of the election outcome, thus affecting the reaction of the US market. Our 
aim is to confirm past findings that suggest escalating volatility fluctuations surrounding an election 
period, and whether any related events would have any impacts on the stability of the capital markets. 
Our result suggests that the 2016 US Presidential Election can be considered a unique case in 
that the reaction of the capital markets throughout the election period and any related news is 
relatively calm, and showing little signs of turbulence. We found that a 31-days event window 
surrounding an election date is the optimal window that portrays the reaction of the capital markets 
toward the election. 
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1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 The financial market has never been a stand-alone, self-sustained universe, unaffected by 
any external factors. On the contrary, it can be perceived as an interconnected web, where its 
efficiency depends on various determinants, one of them being politics. The vast influence of 
political decisions often creates uncertainties that end up shaking financial markets, and although 
there are various forms of political uncertainties, one prominent event is the presidential election, 
especially in the United States. The event reflects potential shifts in financial regulations and 
international relations that may shape the trajectory of the trade, business, and financial 
landscape. Considering the significance of the US as a market leader and a financial benchmark, 
the uncertainties that persist surrounding the event have historically caused fluctuations in the 
capital markets. 
With the exception of the 2008 election where the escalating market fluctuations can be 
attributed to the financial crisis, periods surrounding the US Presidential Election have had 
relatively high volatilities of stocks in the US capital markets. One possible reason is that voters 
judge candidates mainly by their campaigns and usually not through proven results, thus there is a 
level of uncertainty within this period of change that causes the rising volatility. Having said that, 
measuring such uncertainty around varying election periods may result in different outcomes. In 
other words, the extent of uncertainty within the financial market during an election period is 
affected by other contributing factors, including the character of the candidates, the 
competitiveness of the election, as well as whether a certain candidate is running for his second 
period in the office; all of which makes the study of a certain election event unique from another. 
Figures 1 & 2 illustrate the movement of the volatility index associated with the S&P 500 
throughout a 91-days window of the 2012 and the 2004 US Presidential Elections respectively. 
The graphs show that the reactions are different in each of the election, with the 2012 election 
having a longer effect to the volatility of the S&P 500 Index compared to the 2004 election, in 
which the volatility subsided after the event. Although there could be various determinants to the 
different trends, which we will not be discussing in our study, this just shows that the US 
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Presidential Election does influence shocks that occur in the volatility of major indices like the 
S&P 500, and thus affecting the US financial market in general. 
Figure 1.1 VIX Index for 91-days window of the 2012 US Presidential Election Date. Source: Bloomberg L.P. 
 
Figure 1.2 VIX Index for 91-days window of the 2004 US Presidential Election Date. Source: Bloomberg L.P.  
 
 
 
 
 The importance of understanding the market fluctuations during an election period can be 
simplified into three instances. First, it is important to understand that the escalating fluctuations 
in the stock market during an election period can be attributed to the overreaction of the market to 
the election outcome and any related news. Therefore, they are generally not representative of the 
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trajectory of the market, as shown in both the 2008 & 2012 elections when Obama was elected, 
the S&P 500 suffered major losses in the few days following the outcome, and yet the index 
averaged an annual gain of 13.3% in Obama’s administration (Renick, 2016). Second, having the 
right position during the election period may have great impacts on organizations. One example is 
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway that has gained an 8% increase in the NYSE ever since the 
outcome of the 2016 US Presidential Election due to president-elect Donald Trump’s proposed 
policies that benefit the company (Basak, 2016). Finally, the rising VIX index prior to the 
election date shows that many investors do hedge their positions to mitigate the risks of a market 
slump following the election outcomes (Lahart, 2016). 
With that in mind, studies related to the US Presidential Election would bring better 
clarity in terms of understanding the event window of an election event, the proper reaction 
towards an election outcome, trends following the election cycle, as well as measuring the 
normality of market reactions toward an election outcome compared to past elections. These will 
then serve as a solid foundation for investors to perform rational analyses of the market and 
mitigate the risks embedded in their portfolios throughout an election period. 
Our study aims to examine the impact of the US Presidential Election on the volatility of 
the US capital markets. We use data from the 2016 Presidential Election, and we look to confirm 
the results of prior studies on previous elections and see whether the observed trends persist in 
2016. This includes the proposed event-window in which the financial market starts to react to 
any election-related news and the volatility movement during the election date. Although our 
findings regarding the most appropriate event-window aligned with prior studies, we found that 
the 2016 Presidential Election is a unique case in terms of its reactions during and after the 
outcome were made public. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: A literature review to shed light on 
the subject in general, and bring forth prior studies that have touched upon the impact of the US 
Presidential Elections on the financial market. Then it will be followed by a description of the 
contribution of our study, and then an elaboration on our methodologies and data collection 
process. A breakdown of our results will come follow, and then summed together with a section 
on implications and a conclusion. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
Gemmill (1992) and Nippani & Medlin (2002) all agree that political uncertainties 
greatly affect both returns and risks of financial assets, and thus affecting the market as a whole. 
With regards to the shift in political power in the US, there has been a perceived trend regarding 
the influence a political party brings to the table. Both Sy & Zaman (2011) and Santa-Clara & 
Valkanov (2003) have noticed that the financial market usually reacted better under a democratic 
president; a theory that had come to be known as the Presidential Puzzle. Li & Born (2006) also 
acknowledged this very trend, but went on explaining the prominence of the election rather than 
looking at the period of the office. Aside from the nature of the president, an administration 
period may be affected by external situations as well, like natural disasters or war. In that sense, 
the US presidential election can be considered a more prominent factor with regards to 
fluctuations and uncertainties in the market. Li & Born (2006) added that with presidential 
elections, the uncertainties of the outcome are what causing all the commotion in the market. If 
there is a satisfying level of certainty regarding the outcome of the election, there are fewer 
effects in the market. 
Kelly, Pástor, & Veronesi (2016) stated in their study that regardless the extent of the 
uncertainties, any protection regarding price, variance, and tail risks tend to become more 
expensive before political events like the election, signaling the importance of the event. 
Pantzalis, Stangeland, & Turtle (2000) have found significant abnormal returns two weeks prior 
to the election, while Białkowski, Gottschalk, Wisniewski (2008) highlighted volatility shocks 
across international markets within a 51-days event window. Goodell & Vähämaa (2013) noticed 
that the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index increased along with the increasing probability of 
winning for the eventual winner. In other words, as investors form expectations based on 
speculations regarding the potential president-elect, uncertainties grow stronger. There have even 
been studies regarding how to profit from these fluctuations in the market, like one proposed by 
Hobbs & Riley (1984). 
Dobson & Dufrene (1993) found that the impacts of the US Presidential Election are 
global, where the international markets reflect the anxieties of investors awaiting the next future 
leader of an influential nation. They found that overseas market tend to become more correlated 
with the S&P 500 index in the month surrounding the event. This signals the need to diversify for 
many international portfolio managers, but also illustrate the level of importance of the event for 
other markets outside of the US. 
  5 
1.3 Contribution 
Our study will be based on the paper written by Białkowski et al. (2008), considering 
their use of stock market volatility to describe the effects of the US presidential election. 
Although we will not completely follow the methodologies described in their paper, the basic 
idea would remain the same, and that is to determine whether there is abnormal volatility during 
the period before and after the election. 
The difference lies in the point of emphasis, where as they approach the subject to 
determine the period of significant volatility shocks during the election, we will be observing 
major news leading up to the election and see whether they pose any impacts to the capital 
markets in the US. Considering that the 2016 election is a unique case in the sense that there is a 
great degree of competitiveness, with candidates reported in constant scandals, our study aims to 
analyze the periods surrounding these scandals in addition to the election to bring more depth into 
the study of the event. As Li & Born (2006) mentioned, the volatility in the market is often due to 
the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the election, and thus with regards to the 2016 election, 
our study will add value in analyzing competitive elections with no front-runners. 
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2: Methodology & Data 
2.1 Methodology 
 We will be analyzing the impact of the 2016 US Presidential Election and the most 
resonant news throughout the election period using a volatility event-study approach. Volatility 
was the chosen metric due to its sensitivity that portrays greater swing in value, thus depicting a 
clearer reaction or expectation towards an event. We begin our analysis with determining 
stationary properties for the returns of the studied indices and their natural logarithm. Non-
stationary variables may perpetually carry the effect of a shock, which can mislead the robust 
results for the time series analysis. For consistent approach towards handling statistical 
stationarity of returns, we base our analysis on the log-returns of obtained indices. Returns are 
calculated using Equation 1. 𝑅!,! = 𝐸 𝑆!,! = ln !!,!!!,!!!   (1) 
 We then use the GARCH (1,1) framework with autoregressive terms to estimate 
conditional and realized variances of the underlying log-returns with respect to the corresponding 
partial autocorrelations of 𝑅!,! (Bollerslev, 1986; Bollerslev, Chou, & Kroner, 1992; Bollerslev, 
Engle, & Nelson, 1994). 𝑅!,! = 𝛼 + 𝜑!𝑅!,!!!!!!!! + 𝜀!,! , 𝜀!,! ~ 𝑁(0,𝑉!,!)   (2) 𝑉!,! = 𝛾! + 𝛾!𝑉!,!!! + 𝛾!𝜀!,!!!!    (3) 
 Where 𝑅!,! is the continuously compounded return on the US stock market index i on a 
day t, 𝑝! is the lag of autoregressive process with respect to the significant partial autocorrelation 
of 𝑅!,!, 𝜀!,! denotes the realized standard deviations over a chosen time period, and 𝑉!,! stands for 𝑅!,!’s predicted conditional variance.  
We jointly estimate (2) and (3) using the Maximum Likelihood method over the 
estimation window immediately preceding the event window. Taking into consideration the 
clustering of news distribution over the chosen time period for the election campaign, as well as 
the work of Brown & Warner (1985), we have decided to choose a 91-trading day estimation 
window. The chosen estimation window will provide a relatively accurate GARCH process and 
the possibility to include all significant news in our sample. 
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 One should keep in mind that we use a one-step-ahead forecast and this will limit the 
ability to generate an event-independent projection. To study the significance of cumulative 
abnormal volatility over the event window and eliminating the immediate effect of the news on 
forecasted volatility, we will be forecasting our conditional variance on the sth day of our event 
window based on the data set available on the last day of estimation window t*. 
 𝐸 𝑉!,!∗!! Ω!∗) =  𝛾! (𝛾! + 𝛾!)!!!!!!! + (𝛾! + 𝛾!)!!!𝛾!𝑉!,!∗ + (𝛾! + 𝛾!)!!!𝛾!𝜀!,!∗!   (4) 
 
 After obtaining the realized volatility of the indices over the event window from (2) and 
estimated volatility from (4), we calculated cumulative abnormal volatility over the chosen event 
window using Equation 5. 𝐶𝐴𝑉!(𝑡∗ + 1, 𝑡∗∗) = |𝜀!,!! − 𝑉!,!! |!∗∗!!!∗!!   (5) 
 
 Where t*+1 is the start day of the event window, t** is the last day of the event window, 𝜀!,!!  is the squared residuals obtained from (2) and the representation of realized volatility over 
(t*+1, t**) time period, and 𝑉!,!!  is the forecasted volatility over (t*+1, t**) time period. 
Testing the significance of the impact of the election and the relevant news on the 
volatility of the observable indices representing the main spheres of the US economy, we state 
that under the null-hypothesis, the outcome is as expected for the market and has been priced 
accordingly. In other words, the GARCH (1, 1) framework should forecast volatility close to 
realized parameters and cumulative abnormal volatility should not significantly fluctuate from 
zero. 𝐻!:𝐶𝐴𝑉! 𝑡∗ + 1, 𝑡∗∗ = |𝜀!,!! − 𝑉!,!! |!∗∗!!!∗!! = 0  (6) 
 
The test statistic for the hypothesis stated in (6) is therefore, 
 
𝜏! 𝑡∗ + 1, 𝑡∗∗ = (!!,!! !!!,!! )!!!,!!!∗∗!!!∗!!!∗∗!!∗!! ~𝜒(!∗∗!!∗!!)!    (7) 
 
Where (t**-t*-1) are the degrees of freedom for 𝜏!"#$!.!" obtained from 𝜒!distribution table.  
To highlight the contrasts with previous research papers, we apply the same methodology 
described above with the substitution of 𝜀!,!!  in (5), (6), (7) by CBOE implied volatility indices 
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corresponding to the studied indices. We performed the same test (6) and (7) to determine the 
significance of cumulative abnormal volatility between estimated and implied values. To 
reinforce our findings, these tests were completed over 5-, 11- and 21-days event windows. These 
different windows will give us the opportunity to compare results obtained from a longer event 
window during which volatility shocks may fade to a shorter event window over which shocks in 
realized volatility might still be obvious without opportunity to normalize over a long time 
period.  
2.2 Data Collection 
We collected two sets of data that are required to provide a clearer insight to our study. 
The time period of our data ranges from the beginning of 2015 when there are discussions about 
the potential candidacy of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, to approximately 10 trading days 
after the election. There are clear limitations to the data we collected, especially because 
Białkowski et al. (2008) showed that historically, the volatility fluctuations in the financial 
market lasted within a 51 days window. However, due to the time constraint of our study, we 
decided that a 21-days window would be sufficient to illustrate the reactions of the financial 
market to the presidential election. 
 The first set of information we collected was the relevant news concerning both 
presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during their campaigns through media 
outlets like Bloomberg, CNN, The New York Times and Washington Post. From these, we 
narrowed down eight news that can be considered quite influential toward the election outcome 
and thus prompting the reaction of the US capital markets. They were the three presidential 
debates, two email scandals against Hillary Clinton, as well as Donald Trump’s tax and tape 
scandals. Presidential debates were chosen due to their influence on the US electorate. Although 
the debates do not dictate the election outcome, they provide a representative insight on the 
direction of the election.  
The email scandals against Hillary Clinton serve as important news due to the 
repercussions that could include the prohibition of her candidacy in the 2016 election. If her 
candidacy was still allowed, her reputation as a potential leader would be jeopardized, and this 
would effect the direction of the election, and thus the reaction of the market. Another factor to 
consider is that the second investigation for this scandal happened less than two weeks before the 
election date.   
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Donald Trump’s scandals were different compared to Hillary Clinton’s in that his 
scandals were moral issues by nature, whereas Hillary Clinton’s involved legal repercussions. 
The release of a tape with Donald Trump’s lewd comments in it, as well as the report on his tax 
avoidance were chosen due to widespread reaction by news media and the significant impact on 
the perceived public opinion, especially among some social groups. As these events gained 
nation-wide attention, we expect them to have effects on the financial market. 
 To point the event and estimation windows corresponding to each of the news, we 
constructed a set of explanatory variables that clearly determines durations of each window with 
respect to the date of the news appearing in the public. The variables are as follow: 
 
Time indicates the number of observation and begins in January 2nd, 2015. 
 
Days_before_event is defined as the difference between the value of the Time variable at the 
current day and the Time variable at the event day. 
 
Event_window (dummy variable) indicates the interval of dates with chosen length within which 
event occured. 
 
Count_event_observations indicates duration of the Event_window 
 
Estimation_window (dummy variable) indicates the interval of dates which are used to apply the 
GARCH(1,1) framework to forecast volatility. 
The last set of data we collected was the daily returns and volatilities of the major US 
equity indices that track the US financial markets and could be significantly affected by the 
election. We obtained these numbers using the Bloomberg terminal. The goal with this data set is 
to have a variety of data that are representative of the US market. We collected data with the 
previously mentioned time frame for the following indices: 
 
 
 
  10 
Table 2.1 US Stock Indices with corresponding Volatility Indices 
US	Stock	Index	
Ticker	on	
Bloomberg	
Terminal	System	
Corresponding	
Implied	Volatility	
Index	
Ticker	on	
Bloomberg	
Terminal	System	Standard	&	Poor’s	500	Composite	Index	 SPX	INDEX	 CBOE	Volatility	Index	 VIX	INDEX	Standard	&	Poor’s	100	Composite	Index	 OEX	INDEX	 CBOE	S&P	100	Volatility	Index	 VXO	INDEX	NASDAQ	–	100	Index	 NDX	INDEX	 CBOE	NASDAQ	Volatility	Index	 VXN	INDEX	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	 INDU	INDEX	 CBOE	DJIA	Volatility	Index	 VXD	INDEX	Russell	2000	Index	 RTY	INDEX	 CBOE	Russell	2000	Volatility	Index	 RVX	INDEX	
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3: Results 
3.1 General Insights 
With regards to the events leading up to the election, there seemed to be minimal impact 
to the market, and that any increase in volatility cannot be directly linked to the election-related 
news of either candidate. In other words, the market seemed unfazed by any news that would 
affect the direction of the potential president-elect, considering that results of the news being 
linked to the financial market are insignificant for all the event windows we tested. 
Our results show that the GARCH model that was used to forecast volatility trends within 
the event window seemed to align with the realized volatility. While this may be expected for the 
prior events, the election itself should be accompanied with abnormal volatilities, as previously 
highlighted by Białkowski et al. (2008). What was much more apparent in this case was the 
difference in the volatility indices compared to the GARCH model and the realized volatility. The 
movements in implied volatility depict the nature of human behavior that tends to overreact to 
certain news with great deal of uncertainties embedded in them. 
One trend that we expected as we observed the fluctuations in the market was the greater 
significance in abnormal volatility closer to the election date (Pantzalis et al., 2000). This, 
however, was not the case in the 2016 election, signaling that there is a degree of uniqueness in 
this election compared to the past. We found that the results were consistent throughout the five 
indices we had as part of the study. In the following elaborations, we will be using the S&P 500 
index and its corresponding volatility index to illustrate our results, considering its widespread 
use as an indicator of the market, and that it accurately represents the other indices in our results 
as well (See Appendix). 
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3.2 Events 
3.2.1 First Presidential Debate – September 27th, 2016 
Figure 3.1 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	the	First	
2016	US	Presidential	Debate.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
 
As the first major event where both presidential-candidates met, the first presidential 
debate depicted a starting point of a reaction in the market, should there be one. Our results, 
however, indicated that the abnormal volatility within this period does not really reflect the 
occurrence of the event. With online polls suggesting a favorable position for presidential-
candidate Hillary Clinton during the event, the market reacted with a 0.71% increase in the S&P 
500 futures (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2016). This reaction, however, was not portrayed in the 
volatility movements, suggesting that the result of the debate was not out of the expectations of 
the market, and thus volatility remaining stable. 
Table 3.1 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	the	First	Presidential	
Debate.	
First Presidential Debate 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 spxindex 0.6819 0.9535 do not reject null 
vixindex 0.7744 0.9418 do not reject null 
11 
spxindex 1.1654 0.9997 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.4379 0.9991 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 1.1482 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.4394 1.0000 do not reject null 
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The results in the table above indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis in that 
there is no abnormal volatility recorded with the S&P 500 index. The VIX Index also portrayed 
the same outcome, with insignificant p-values. This demonstrates that although the expectations 
toward the event were much greater than reality, there seems to be minimal indications regarding 
the existence of abnormal volatilities. 
What can be drawn out of this result is that the event does not pose much threat to the 
stability of the capital markets, and even though the outcome of the debate had an arguably strong 
influence in the direction of the eventual election, there is too little information at this point to 
determine the future of the market. As mentioned earlier, this result was not out of the ordinary, 
as it remained consistent with previous studies that indicate there is a certain window when 
market starts reacting more to any election-related news. 
3.2.2 Donald Trump Tax Scandal – October 4th, 2016 | Donald Trump Tape Scandal – 
October 7th, 2016  
Figure 3.2 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	Donald	
Trump’s	Tax	Scandal.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
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Figure 3.3 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	Donald	
Trump’s	Tape	Scandal.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
 
 
These events represent a few of the bigger scandals experienced by either candidate, and 
were the beginning of a series of leaked reputational hazards for Donald Trump. Trump was a 
unique candidate in that his blunt way of speech has earned him a reputation of honesty by some 
parties, but also viewed inappropriate by others. His various claims and promises during his 
campaign, including the ban of all Muslims in the United States (Diamond, 2015) have prompted 
both positive and negative responses, and this indicated a greater perceived uncertainty should he 
become president. These uncertainties, however, were not captured by our result, as shown in the 
graph above, where the realized volatilities seemed to align almost perfectly with the estimated 
volatilities. 
Table 3.2 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	Donald	Trump’s	Tax	
Scandal.	
Donald Trump Tax Scandal 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 spxindex 0.3700 0.9849 do not reject null 
vixindex 0.9623 0.9155 do not reject null 
11 
spxindex 0.8762 0.9999 do not reject null 
vixindex 0.9625 0.9999 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 0.9654 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.2081 1.0000 do not reject null 
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Table 3.3 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	For	Donald	Trump’s	
Tape	Scandal.	
 
Donald Trump Tape Scandal 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 spxindex 0.2510 0.9928 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.8528 0.7628 do not reject null 
11 spxindex 0.3006 1.0000 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.2930 0.9994 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 0.7095 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.1511 1.0000 do not reject null 
 
Although this was a major event that could impact Donald Trump’s electability, the 
market seemed to react rather optimistically to the news. There seemed to be consistent 
movements between the realized and the estimated volatility, indicating that there was no 
abnormality recorded in terms of the stability of the market. One interesting trend that could be 
observed out of the Trump scandals is that there seemed to be more reactions in the market 
compared to the Clinton scandals (See Section 3.2.4). Due to presidential-candidate Trump’s 
media presence, the market seemed to react more towards his scandals that could have influential 
impacts toward the election outcome. While there was no abnormal volatility recorded during 
these periods, the difference in reactions between the two candidates does illustrate how the 
capital markets judge the level of uncertainties involved in the electability of one candidate 
compared to another. 
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3.2.3 Second Presidential Debate – October 10th, 2016 
Figure 3.4 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	the	Second	
Presidential	Debate.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
 
 
The trend of a calm market still remained until the second presidential debate, which shed 
light on the former-presidential-candidate Donald Trump’s controversies regarding taxes and the 
recorded tape. At this point, the market seemed to have sets of expectations that mitigate 
uncertainties, as illustrated with the constant trend. The graph above portrays a slight shock in 
volatility after the debate, but this cannot be considered abnormal since the estimated volatility 
also forecasted similar trends. What can be observed, however, is the same shock lasted longer 
for the implied volatility, signaling a pattern where human behavior has influenced the stability of 
the market. The graph portrays that the shock in realized and estimated volatilities were only 
present for 1 trading day, while the rise in implied volatility lasted for about 5 trading days. This 
means that the market expected a longer impact than what occurred in reality. Some reasons of 
this trend could include the widespread access to the market that allows individuals who does not 
behave rationally to influence the trajectory of the market.  We will not be elaborating these 
reasons further due to the scope of our study, but this trend is definitely a matter that can be 
explored in more depth. 
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Table 3.4 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	the	Second	
Presidential	Debate. 
Second Presidential Debate 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 
spxindex 0.2310 0.9938 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.9777 0.7399 do not reject null 
11 spxindex 0.2717 1.0000 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.4690 0.9990 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 0.6646 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.1739 1.0000 do not reject null 
 
The observation is reinforced with the results in the table, which shows consistent trends 
in that there are no significant results for the abnormal volatilities. It can be observed that implied 
volatility, in its essence will be much greater than the estimated volatility, while the realized will 
be somewhere in the middle. So the trend we are looking for is not that implied volatility is 
greater than the estimated volatility, rather that the movement of implied volatility remained 
relatively constant, with no significant jumps within periods surrounding the events. This result 
illustrates that even one month prior to the election date can still be considered too early to see the 
effects of the election on the capital markets. 
3.2.4 Hillary Clinton Email Scandal – October 17th, 2016 | Hillary Clinton Email Scandal 
Two – October 28th, 2016 
Figure 3.5 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	Hillary	
Clinton’s	First	Email	Scandal.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
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Figure 3.6 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	Hillary	
Clinton’s	Second	Email	Scandal.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
 
 
The timeline of the scandals for both of the candidates were unique in the sense that they 
cluster in a certain period of time. In this case, Donald Trump’s scandals occurred before the 
second presidential debate, while Hillary Clinton’s occurred after. Looking at the graphs above, 
there were no immediate impacts of the Clinton scandals to the capital markets, despite being 
closer to the election date. The fluctuations in volatilities seemed to be perfectly captured by the 
estimated volatilities, showing no abnormalities. 
As mentioned earlier, the difference in reactions between the Trump scandals and the 
Clinton scandals seemed to be obvious, with Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 showing steady-state 
movements during the periods of the two events. The shocks that can be seen in both graphs can 
be attributed to the second presidential debate and the election date respectively, considering the 
proximity of these scandals to other events that we chose to analyze.  
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Table 3.5 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	Hillary	Clinton’s	First	
Email	Scandal.	
 
Hillary Clinton Email Scandal 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 spxindex 0.1856 0.9960 do not reject null 
vixindex 2.3724 0.6676 do not reject null 
11 spxindex 1.4463 0.9991 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.9118 0.9970 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 1.1711 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.6944 1.0000 do not reject null 
 
Table 3.6 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	Hillary	Clinton’s	
Second	Email	Scandal.	
 
Hillary Clinton Email Scandal Two 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 spxindex 0.1339 0.9979 do not reject null 
vixindex 2.0942 0.7184 do not reject null 
11 spxindex 0.1687 1.0000 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.8301 0.9975 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 0.2240 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.6856 1.0000 do not reject null 
 
The tables above reinforce the results, with similar trends as previous events. Looking at 
the p-values of the realized volatilities, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there was no 
abnormal volatility throughout the period surrounding the events. By the looks of the graph, 
however, the implied volatility seemed to show slightly more movements, depicting the 
anxiousness of the market, as the election date gets closer. 
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3.2.5 Third Presidential Debate – October 20th, 2016 
Figure 3.7 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	the	Third	
Presidential	Debate.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
Table 3.7 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	the	Third	Presidential	
Debate. 
Third Presidential Debate 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 spxindex 0.4048 0.9821 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.7694 0.7781 do not reject null 
11 spxindex 0.2588 1.0000 do not reject null 
vixindex 1.8752 0.9972 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 1.0671 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.7974 1.0000 do not reject null 
 
The third and final presidential debate marked the last time both candidates face each 
other to present their cases. Although implied volatility seemed to be reacting throughout this 
period, which can be considered normal as per prior studies regarding the presidential election, 
there was minimal movements in the realized volatility, and the GARCH model, which forecasted 
the volatility using data from previous periods, captured this. The table above also offers the same 
explanation, showing that the null hypothesis of no abnormal volatility cannot be rejected for the 
realized volatility.		 
The shock in the VIX Index suggests that the reaction towards the presidential election 
becomes more apparent, with people hedging their positions and managing their risks by 
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purchasing derivatives. The upward trend of the implied volatility persisted until the election 
date, showing that there was much anticipation of the outcome of the election, regardless of who 
the eventual winner will be. 
3.2.6 2016 US Presidential Election – November 9th, 2016 
Figure 3.8 Portrays	the	movements	of	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatilities	within	a	21-days	window	of	the	2016	US	
Presidential	Election.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
 
 
The reaction of the 2016 US Presidential Election was far from normal, to say the least. 
Looking at the graph above, there seemed to be quite a shock in volatility within a 5-days event 
window. This shock, however, subsided straight after the result of the election was announced, 
and the volatility ended up becoming lower and more stable for the next 10 days. This is an 
interesting result, considering that the market reaction of the election usually lasts longer than just 
overnight, and thus signaling that there are other determinants of the US election that had not 
been observed by previous studies. 
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Table 3.8 Presents	test	statistics	and	p-value	of	the	difference	between	the	S&P	500	volatility	movements	as	well	as	the	VIX	
index	compared	to	the	GARCH	forecast	for	5-days,	11-days,	and	21-days	event	windows	for	the	2016	US	
Presidential	Election. 
2016 US Presidential Election 
Event Window Index Test Statistics P-Value Decision (α=0.05) 
5 
spxindex 8.1805 0.0852 do not reject null 
vixindex 2.0077 0.7343 do not reject null 
11 spxindex 5.4548 0.8588 do not reject null 
vixindex 2.5651 0.9899 do not reject null 
21 spxindex 3.2898 1.0000 do not reject null vixindex 1.9019 1.0000 do not reject null 
 
Looking at the above table, the p-value for the 5-days event window seemed close to 
becoming significant, thus consistent with the graph where it shows a shock in volatility within 
the same window. Our results show that the US capital markets did react and will always react to 
the uncertainties posed by the presidential election. However, just like the 2016 election, where 
the competitiveness seemed to be at a higher level, and that the candidates were not some of the 
most predictable leaders, there could be different reactions in the market. 
Figure 3.9 Portrays	the	normalized	difference	between	implied,	realized,	and	estimated	volatility	within	a	21-days	window	
of	the	2016	US	Presidential	Election.	Source:	StataCorp,	2015.	
 
 
Another way to observe the reaction of the US capital markets on the election is the 
normalized volatility within the period of the event. The purpose of this graph is to amplify the 
movements of the volatilities to better capture the differences in trends. It can be seen in Figure 
3.9 that the estimated volatility followed the realized volatility closely with a 1-day lag. With the 
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implied volatility, the upward movement prior to the election can be caused by derivatives 
purchases to hedge against the election outcome. 
What is interesting was the reaction after the event, which was contradictory to the noise 
in the media prior to the election. With many articles and analyses from the New York Times 
(Sorkin, 2016), CNBC (Domm, 2016), and Bloomberg (Wong & Debnath, 2016), to name a few, 
there were widespread perceptions that the election of Donald Trump would drive the capital 
markets down, and weaken the US economy. With that in mind, the expected reaction after the 
election outcome was announced was that volatility would be chaotic, and the market would be in 
an uproar. In fact, that did happen as portrayed by the sudden shock in the realized volatility, but 
it quickly subsided just after 1 day of the election, where the volatility plateaued and gradually 
reached an all period low. 
The outcome of the 2016 US Presidential Election was one of two great turnarounds that 
occurred in 2016. The ‘Brexit’ event that occurred earlier in the year also displayed the same 
result, in that the volatility shock only lasted for a very short period of time. Whether there are 
changes in the way the market view political uncertainties, or that these two events were simply 
‘black swans’ to what was once a common trend when uncertainty was right around the corner, 
there are still implications that could be derived for individuals and firms to assess their positions 
and manage their risks. 
3.3 Implications & Limitations 
Our results indicate that the US market reacted unpredictably optimistic against what 
some thought was a low-probability event (Meckler, 2016). This calm demeanor of the capital 
markets also contradicts previous studies on the US presidential election, signaling the need to 
revisit the subject with more in-depth observations and analyses. We also determined that there 
were little impacts of news to the market with more than 1-month before the election date, 
considering the insignificant reactions even to major events surrounding the presidential election. 
With more influential news come greater reactions, but the shocks to the market were clearly 
apparent only closer to the election date, with event windows varying from time to time. Having 
said this, summing together our results with the results from Białkowski et al. (2008), the 
appropriate event window where market seemed to be reacting the most would be a 31-days event 
window. 
To determine why these results were obtained would be the next step towards solving this 
unusual market reaction. Throughout the span of the past few elections, there have been major 
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changes that could play a role as to why the market did not react as expected. These changes 
include negative interest rates, which are becoming more widespread, increasing speed of 
information distribution worldwide, access to the financial market, as well as social issues within 
the US and overseas. To take account into each of these events would help single out 
determinants that play a big role in influencing the reaction of the market toward the election 
outcome. These	factors	become clear limitations to our results, in addition to the event window 
limitations we had due to time constraints. We have also yet to explore the impact of the election 
on international markets, where specific to this year’s election, the current president-elect Donald 
Trump’s campaign on slowing down cross-border activities will affect not only the domestic but 
also the international markets. 
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4: Conclusion 
The financial market does not run independently, rather it is greatly affected by factors 
that, at first glance, does not seem to possess much influence on the market. One of these factors 
is political uncertainty that greatly affects the trajectory of the financial market. The US 
Presidential Election has been studied as an influential event that has impacts not only in the local 
market, but also overseas. With that said, there is a degree of curiosity that continues to drive 
incoming studies regarding the subject, so as to refine and confirm the proposed trends 
surrounding the event. 
Our empirical study has shown that the 2016 US Presidential Election has a considerably 
different reaction from the expected trends from previous elections. There is a degree of calmness 
perceived in the market throughout the span of the election, with influential events prior to the 
election date not disrupting the stability of the US capital markets. While the expected reaction is 
shown in the implied volatility, the realized volatility seemed to draw a different picture, and this 
leads to the question of what may cause these differences in the reactions of the market. 
Even with the uniqueness of the most recent US election, the implications for individuals 
or firms who would like to manage their positions during these volatile periods are still apparent. 
A window of 31 days surrounding the event seemed to show the most fluctuations and shocks in 
volatility, indicating that there is a degree of anxiousness in the general election itself, but these 
trends will be strengthened or weakened by unique factors that will vary for different elections. 
With that said, there is a need for market participants to start analyzing the trajectory of a certain 
election, beginning at the proposed event window, in order to be manage their risks and be at a 
stable position during these periods of uncertainties. 
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5: Appendix 
Result for all obtained indices and event windows. 
Event Window = 5 Days 
   
  
Event Window = 11 Days 
   
 
Event Window = 21 days 
 
 
11/9/16 
US Presidential 
Election 
  
11/9/16 
US Presidential 
Election 
 
11/9/16 
US Presidential  
Election 
   
  
     
  
     
 
cav test   
   
cav test   
  
cav test 
 SPX 6.46 8.18 not 
  
SPX 8.18 5.45 not 
 
SPX 16.13 3.29 not 
NDX 12.43 6.65 not 
  
NDX 71.77 3.91 not 
 
NDX 46.84 2.78 not 
OEX 6.95 8.84 not 
  
OEX 8.63 5.90 not 
 
OEX 16.44 3.30 not 
INDU 7.46 9.41 not 
  
INDU 8.40 6.19 not 
 
INDU 15.10 3.28 not 
RTY 18.92 5.63 not 
  
RTY 31.13 3.20 not 
 
RTY 45.87 2.21 not 
VIX 3.68 2.01 not 
  
VIX 9.05 2.57 not 
 
VIX 22.03 1.90 not 
VXN 5.38 2.77 not 
  
VXN 62.67 2.13 not 
 
VXN 41.76 1.73 not 
VXO 3.63 2.20 not 
  
VXO 9.41 3.05 not 
 
VXO 22.60 2.23 not 
VXD 3.39 2.52 not 
  
VXD 8.48 3.25 not 
 
VXD 22.94 2.54 not 
RVX 2.74 0.58 not 
  
RVX 17.34 0.65 not 
 
RVX 32.30 0.61 not 
   
  
     
  
     
   
  
     
  
     
9/27/16 
First Presidential 
Debate 
  
9/27/16 
First Presidential 
Debate 
 
9/27/16 
First Presidential  
Debate 
   
  
     
  
     
 
cav test   
   
cav test   
  
cav test 
 SPX 2.52 0.68 not 
  
SPX 4.02 1.17 not 
 
SPX 11.44 1.15 not 
NDX 2.57 0.36 not 
  
NDX 4.87 0.68 not 
 
NDX 16.45 1.35 not 
OEX 2.78 0.97 not 
  
OEX 3.40 0.99 not 
 
OEX 8.37 0.98 not 
INDU 2.60 0.86 not 
  
INDU 3.51 0.93 not 
 
INDU 9.33 0.85 not 
RTY 5.17 0.73 not 
  
RTY 9.15 0.63 not 
 
RTY 20.23 0.72 not 
VIX 2.48 0.77 not 
  
VIX 5.65 1.44 not 
 
VIX 13.47 1.44 not 
VXN 2.14 0.46 not 
  
VXN 5.07 0.88 not 
 
VXN 15.84 1.35 not 
VXO 2.69 0.98 not 
  
VXO 6.24 1.55 not 
 
VXO 13.50 1.40 not 
VXD 2.67 0.98 not 
  
VXD 6.09 1.48 not 
 
VXD 13.25 1.23 not 
RVX 2.03 0.31 not 
  
RVX 4.55 0.37 not 
 
RVX 13.64 0.55 not 
   
  
     
  
     10/4/16 Trump Taxes   
  
10/4/16 Trump Taxes   
 
10/4/16 Trump Taxes 
 
   
  
     
  
     
 
cav test   
   
cav test   
  
cav test 
 SPX 1.09 0.37 not 
  
SPX 4.71 0.88 not 
 
SPX 8.00 0.97 not 
NDX 1.06 0.35 not 
  
NDX 5.40 0.80 not 
 
NDX 13.72 0.73 not 
OEX 0.69 0.29 not 
  
OEX 3.68 1.02 not 
 
OEX 5.82 0.91 not 
INDU 1.11 0.37 not 
  
INDU 3.81 0.91 not 
 
INDU 6.17 0.85 not 
RTY 3.43 0.60 not 
  
RTY 10.69 0.91 not 
 
RTY 18.87 0.70 not 
VIX 2.53 0.96 not 
  
VIX 6.30 0.96 not 
 
VIX 13.48 1.21 not 
VXN 3.23 1.13 not 
  
VXN 6.95 1.15 not 
 
VXN 17.18 1.02 not 
VXO 2.79 1.22 not 
  
VXO 6.61 1.19 not 
 
VXO 13.92 1.34 not 
VXD 2.73 1.15 not 
  
VXD 6.73 1.03 not 
 
VXD 13.58 1.23 not 
RVX 2.31 0.36 not 
  
RVX 4.95 0.36 not 
 
RVX 10.52 0.34 not 
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     10/7/16 Trump Tape Scandal 
  
10/7/16 Trump Tape Scandal 
 
10/7/16 Trump Tape Scandal 
   
  
     
  
     
 
cav test   
   
cav test   
  
cav test 
 SPX 1.94 0.25 not 
  
SPX 5.21 0.30 not 
 
SPX 8.85 0.71 not 
NDX 2.52 0.16 not 
  
NDX 8.61 0.26 not 
 
NDX 13.06 0.58 not 
OEX 1.30 0.16 not 
  
OEX 3.09 0.21 not 
 
OEX 6.56 0.85 not 
INDU 1.67 0.28 not 
  
INDU 3.63 0.28 not 
 
INDU 6.59 0.78 not 
RTY 4.24 0.44 not 
  
RTY 11.40 0.48 not 
 
RTY 19.79 0.71 not 
VIX 3.62 1.85 not 
  
VIX 7.72 1.29 not 
 
VIX 14.79 1.15 not 
VXN 4.28 2.18 not 
  
VXN 11.12 1.32 not 
 
VXN 17.89 1.17 not 
VXO 3.89 2.34 not 
  
VXO 7.04 1.61 not 
 
VXO 14.14 1.42 not 
VXD 3.85 2.02 not 
  
VXD 7.05 1.40 not 
 
VXD 14.09 1.22 not 
RVX 2.44 0.72 not 
  
RVX 6.11 0.45 not 
 
RVX 11.72 0.39 not 
   
  
     
  
     
   
  
     
  
     
10/10/16 
Second Presidential 
Debate 
  
10/10/16 
Second Presidential 
Debate 
 
10/10/16 
Second Presidential 
Debate 
   
  
     
  
     
 
cav test   
   
cav test   
  
cav test 
 SPX 3.42 0.23 not 
  
SPX 4.99 0.27 not 
 
SPX 8.10 0.66 not 
NDX 6.91 0.23 not 
  
NDX 8.88 0.21 not 
 
NDX 13.60 0.56 not 
OEX 2.06 0.19 not 
  
OEX 2.98 0.20 not 
 
OEX 6.13 0.81 not 
INDU 2.55 0.29 not 
  
INDU 3.65 0.30 not 
 
INDU 5.74 0.68 not 
RTY 7.49 0.43 not 
  
RTY 11.43 0.42 not 
 
RTY 18.40 0.67 not 
VIX 3.58 1.98 not 
  
VIX 8.78 1.47 not 
 
VIX 14.65 1.17 not 
VXN 6.78 2.14 not 
  
VXN 13.07 1.66 not 
 
VXN 18.06 1.22 not 
VXO 3.34 2.47 not 
  
VXO 8.01 1.87 not 
 
VXO 14.16 1.48 not 
VXD 3.20 2.31 not 
  
VXD 8.09 1.74 not 
 
VXD 14.05 1.31 not 
RVX 4.15 0.66 not 
  
RVX 6.63 0.46 not 
 
RVX 11.43 0.38 not 
   
  
     
  
     
   
  
     
  
     
10/17/16 Clinton FBI Email 
  
10/17/16 
Clinton FBI 
Email   
 
10/17/16 
Clinton FBI  
Email 
   
  
     
  
     
 
cav test   
   
cav test   
  
cav test 
 SPX 0.55 0.19 not 
  
SPX 3.91 1.45 not 
 
SPX 5.88 1.17 not 
NDX 1.59 0.45 not 
  
NDX 9.38 1.55 not 
 
NDX 13.80 1.16 not 
OEX 0.45 0.19 not 
  
OEX 2.69 1.19 not 
 
OEX 3.92 0.92 not 
INDU 0.22 0.12 not 
  
INDU 2.85 1.21 not 
 
INDU 4.10 0.89 not 
RTY 2.35 0.59 not 
  
RTY 9.66 1.08 not 
 
RTY 16.87 0.86 not 
VIX 4.26 2.37 not 
  
VIX 8.64 1.91 not 
 
VIX 16.74 1.69 not 
VXN 4.18 3.50 not 
  
VXN 11.84 2.49 not 
 
VXN 20.25 2.29 not 
VXO 4.45 2.77 not 
  
VXO 8.64 2.24 not 
 
VXO 16.59 1.98 not 
VXD 4.34 2.72 not 
  
VXD 8.55 2.24 not 
 
VXD 16.62 1.89 not 
RVX 2.61 0.48 not 
  
RVX 7.40 0.51 not 
 
RVX 11.94 0.49 not 
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10/20/16 
Third Presidential 
Debate 
  
10/20/16 
Third Presidential 
Debate 
 
10/20/16 
Third Presidential  
Debate 
   
  
     
  
     SPX 0.73 0.40 not 
  
SPX 0.95 0.26 not 
 
SPX 5.30 1.07 not 
NDX 2.44 0.80 not 
  
NDX 4.67 0.56 not 
 
NDX 13.13 1.18 not 
OEX 0.62 0.33 not 
  
OEX 0.94 0.22 not 
 
OEX 4.04 0.86 not 
INDU 0.32 0.15 not 
  
INDU 0.50 0.11 not 
 
INDU 3.60 0.83 not 
RTY 1.67 0.46 not 
  
RTY 4.28 0.48 not 
 
RTY 17.55 0.84 not 
VIX 3.73 1.77 not 
  
VIX 8.77 1.88 not 
 
VIX 17.40 1.80 not 
VXN 3.72 1.82 not 
  
VXN 8.79 2.51 not 
 
VXN 19.70 2.10 not 
VXO 4.01 2.34 not 
  
VXO 9.33 2.30 not 
 
VXO 18.13 2.15 not 
VXD 3.99 2.24 not 
  
VXD 9.17 2.23 not 
 
VXD 17.63 2.04 not 
RVX 3.19 0.75 not 
  
RVX 5.50 0.55 not 
 
RVX 12.49 0.60 not 
   
  
     
  
     
   
  
     
  
     10/28/16 Clinton FBI Email Two 
  
10/28/16 Clinton FBI Email Two 
 
10/28/16 Clinton FBI Email Two 
   
  
     
  
     SPX 0.70 0.13 not 
  
SPX 1.28 0.17 not 
 
SPX 14.85 0.22 not 
NDX 1.86 0.47 not 
  
NDX 5.97 1.01 not 
 
NDX 41.11 0.77 not 
OEX 0.75 0.45 not 
  
OEX 1.54 0.37 not 
 
OEX 15.38 0.29 not 
INDU 0.53 0.18 not 
  
INDU 0.80 0.17 not 
 
INDU 14.14 0.15 not 
RTY 3.79 0.68 not 
  
RTY 7.23 0.49 not 
 
RTY 38.93 0.48 not 
VIX 4.54 2.09 not 
  
VIX 9.96 1.83 not 
 
VIX 22.23 1.69 not 
VXN 4.09 1.27 not 
  
VXN 7.78 1.39 not 
 
VXN 38.54 1.50 not 
VXO 4.95 3.04 not 
  
VXO 10.83 2.45 not 
 
VXO 23.08 2.18 not 
VXD 4.81 2.90 not 
  
VXD 10.53 2.36 not 
 
VXD 22.33 2.09 not 
RVX 2.49 0.28 not 
  
RVX 5.78 0.55 not 
 
RVX 25.98 0.49 not 
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